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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SAFETY OF 
NUCLEAR-POWERED MERCHANT SHIPSf 
William H. Berman* and Lee M. Hydeman** 
Few men combine the attributes of scholarship, leadership, imagination, industry, 
and intellectual curiosity that have characterized the professional career of E. 
Blythe Stason. It was typical, for example, in 19-16, when the full implications of 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy were merely a glimmer to most persons, that 
this man would have the foresight to recognize that nuclear technology would have 
a great impact on both public and private law. It was still more typical that Dean 
Stason, having recognized this inevitable amalgamation of science and law, would 
undertake to become an authority on the problems that loomed ahead. In the 
ensuing years Dean Stason has made both significant and voluminous contributions 
to the legal, policy, and, for the layman, technical literature on atomic energy and 
the law. [See p. 185 supra. - Ed.] 
Dean Stason has brought his wisdom and experience in the field of administrative 
law to bear upon the many complex public law problems which the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy have engendered. His published works in this field have ranged 
from an early paper on the difficulties likely to be encountered, and the juridical 
dangers, in attempting to regulate complex technological activities, to a more recent 
collaborative monograph in which the authors proposed an imaginative and 
practicable role for state governments in connection with the control of radiation 
hazards. 
Since 1956 Dean Stason's efforts have been devoted increasingly to the private 
law aspects of radiation injury. A series of speeches and articles pertaining to the 
tort liability aspects of atomic energy culminated in 1959 in the publication (with 
Professors Estep and Pierce) of Atoms and the Law, a comprehensive and scholarly 
volume which will stand as the definitive treatise on the radiation liability problem 
for years to come. 
During the past two years the authors have had the privilege and pleasure of 
working under the general guidance of this man of remarkable qualities and 
achievements. This close association has increased their admiration and respect for 
him. It is, then, with sincere affection that the paper which follows is dedicated 
to a friend and mentor, Dean E. Blythe Stason. - W.H.B. and L.M.H. 
I N recent years we have witnessed the transition of nuclear-powered ships from an imaginative dream to an engineering 
reality. This vast step from the drawing board to successful op-
eration on the high-seas has taken place in a remarkably short 
span of time. Nevertheless, in the :flush of enthusiasm over the 
technological achievement, we must not lose sight of the fact that 
the promise of nuclear power for the propulsion of ships will not 
have been fulfilled until nuclear vessels are operating safely and 
economically over the maritime trade routes of the world. It 
would be unrealistic to assume that further progress, from military 
and demonstration vessels subsidized by governments, to com-
t This article is based upon a paper which the authors presented before EURATOM's 
International Symposium on Legal and Administrative Problems of Protection in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Brussels, Belgium, Sept. 5-8, 1960. 
• Member, District of Columbia and Ohio bars; co-director of The University of Mich-
igan Law School Atomic Energy Research Project.-Ed. 
•• Member, District of Columbia bar; co-director of The University of l\.fichigan Law 
School Atomic Energy Research Project. - Ed. 
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mercially competitive merchantmen, will not be more difficult, 
more time-consuming, and more taxing to our ingenuity than the 
steps taken thus far. 
l. THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR SHIP OPERATION 
Significant technical, legal, and administrative problems re-
main as barriers to the widespread operation of nuclear merchant 
vessels. The major categories of difficulty are ship economics, ship 
safety, and legal liability for radiation damage. These interrelated 
problem areas have been highlighted by three major conferences 
during the past year. 
A. Ship Economics 
The primary requisite to the commercial operation of nuclear 
ships is to make them economically competitive with conventional 
ships. This was the principal subject of a merchant ship industry 
conference in Philadelphia in April 1960.1 The Philadelphia 
Conference was neither planned nor expected to achieve specific 
solutions to problems of the economics of nuclear ships. In fact, 
to a considerable extent, the Conference constituted a restatement 
of earlier predictions on the achievement of economic nuclear 
vessels2 and an intensification of conflicting views on the outlook.3 
The Conference, however, did serve the valuable purpose of pro-
viding new perspective. In this connection, a significant observa-
tion was made in partial response to the general mood of pessimism 
that pervaded the Conference; the speaker noted that most existing 
plans for the nuclear propulsion of ships are still on paper and 
pointed out that "you make much greater progress when you work 
with things."4 In addition, the nature of many of the existing 
technological problems, and the areas of development most worthy 
of early attention, were identified distinctly.5 Further, it was made 
1 Conference on the Role of Nuclear Propulsion in Merchant Shipping, sponsored by 
the Atomic Industrial Forum, April 28-30, 1960. 
2 HYDEMAN & BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARmME AcnvmES 9 
(1960). 
3 Contrast, for example, the assertion of John H. Lancaster, Bethlehem Steel Company, 
that economic nuclear ships may be one hundred years in the future, N.Y. Times, April 
30, 1960, p. 36M, col. 8, with the statement of David L. Gorman, George G. Sharp, Inc., 
to the effect that certain ship applications of nuclear propulsion would be competitive 
now, reported in Atomic Industrial Forum, The Forum Memo, May 1960, p. 10. 
4 Luncheon remarks of Francis K. McCune, reported in Atomic Industrial Forum, 
The Forum Memo, May 1960, p. 10. 
5 Remarks of Louis H. Roddis, Jr., Chairman, NAS-NRC Maritime Research Advisory 
Committee, reported in Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic Industry Reporter, News and 
Analysis 6:139 (1960). 
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abundantly clear that nuclear ship technology cannot be viewed 
as a mere extension of the technology for central station power 
plants,° and that the achievement of economic nuclear ships will 
not be easy. In this latter context, there was general recognition 
that effective solutions to the concomitant problems of legal 
liability and safety control could be instrumental in facilitating 
the approach to competitive nuclear propulsion and essential to 
ultimate success. 
B. Liability for Nuclear Damage 
Another nongovernmental conference on nuclear ships took 
place in Rijeka, Yugoslavia in September 1959, and was directed 
to the problem of potential liability for damage arising out of a 
release of fission products from a nuclear-powered ship. The 
Rijeka Conference was convened by the International Maritime 
Committee in recognition of the importance of an early resolution 
of the liability problem and of the fact that none of the nuclear 
liability conventions then under consideration7 was sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover nuclear-powered vessels. The Conference 
prepared a draft convention on the liability of ship operators.8 
The Rijeka draft provides for the sole and absolute liability of 
the operator for radiation injuries arising out of the fuel used in 
the ship,0 except for willful damage caused by claimants or others.I_O 
The draft also deals with related matters, such as the establishment 
of a period of limitation on claims and the selection of a forum 
for asserting claims, and adopts a specific rule to cover instances 
of contributory nuclear damage.11 Two vital matters, however~ 
remain open. First, although the draft provides for a limitation 
on the liability of a duly licensed operator, no specific monetary 
limit was adopted.12 Second, the draft requires only that an op-
6 In his remarks, Louis H. Roddis, Jr. directed attention to the difference in power 
level requirements between most ships and central station power plants. Ibid. For an 
extensive description of the major differences between ship and stationary reactor power 
plants, sec HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 84-87. 
7 In September, 1959, Euratom, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency all were preparing or considering drafts of 
liability conventions for land-based atomic energy activities. 
8 THE MARITIME LAw AssocIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL ENGLISH DRAFT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO TIIE L\BILITY OF OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR SHIPS, 
Document No. 434, October 20, 1959. 
o Id., Art. II (i). 
10 Id., Art. II (v) &: (vi). 
11 Id., Arts. V, VII, &: XII. 
12 ld., Art. III (i), provides that "An operator of a nuclear ship ••• shall in no cir-
cumstances be liable for more than ____ in respect of any one nuclear incident .••• " 
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erator maintain the amount of insurance specified by the licensing 
State;13 no agreement was reached on what would be an appropriate 
amount of insurance. It is precisely in these unresolved issues that 
the major problems of international agreement on the liability 
question lie. 
A limit on liability, of course, must be sufficiently high to make 
nuclear ships acceptable in most ports. As indicated by experience 
·with land-based nuclear facilities, such a limit probably will be 
beyond the capacity of the insurance underwriters. In recognition 
of these facts, the delegates to the Rijeka Conference acknowledged 
that governmental indemnification probably would be necessary 
to supplement available insurance.14 However, they took the posi-
tion that a monetary limit on liability, the amount and terms of 
insurance required, and the means for supplementing insurance 
with governmental indemnities, were all essentially matters for 
governments to resolve at a diplomatic conference.15 Thus, while 
the Rijeka Conference did achieve specific agreement on a number 
of difficult legal questions, the issues most crucial to a resolution of 
the problem of legal liability were not resolved.16 
C. Ship Safety 
The third of the recent conferences dealing ·with nuclear 
propulsion for ships, and the one of primary concern for purposes 
of this paper, was the intergovernmental Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) Conference in London during May and June of 1960. 
While the Conference was concerned with the general subject of 
ship safety, one committee17 devoted its efforts exclusively to pos-
sible amendments to the 1948 Safety of Life at Sea Convention18 
to provide for regulating the safety of nuclear-powered vessels. To 
facilitate an appreciation of the context in which these discussions 
were held, some background on the traditional approach to inter-
national agreement on the safety of ships at sea is necessary. 
13 Id., Art. III (ii). 
14Id., Recommendations, I, Art. m. 
15 Ibid. Present plans contemplate the convening of such a diplomatic conference by 
the Government of Belgium during 1961. 
16 An excellent summary of the liability problem is contained in Konz, On Interna-
tional Action in Connection with Liability and Insurance for Nuclear Powered Ships, re• 
marks before the Conference on the Role of Nuclear Propulsion in Merchant Shipping, 
supra note I. 
17 The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear-Powered Ships. 
18 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, June 10, 1948, T.I.A.S. 
No. 2495, 164 U.N.T.S. 113. 
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The first SOLAS Conference was convened in 1914, largely as 
an outgrowth of the S.S. Titanic disaster. Other major conferences 
on ship safety followed in 1929, 1930, and 1948.19 At these later 
conferences, maritime safety conventions were drafted; the Load 
Line Convention of 193020 and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
of 194821 remain in force. The basic approach to control adopted 
by both conventions is identical. They contain detailed regula-
tions pertinent to various elements of ship safety. Contracting 
States are obligated to impose the substance of those regulations on 
ships which fly their flags and are authorized to issue safety certifi-
cates to those vessels as evidence of compliance. While primary 
responsibility for inspection and for enforcement of the regulations 
is reposed in the flag State, other contracting States have the right 
to inspect and verify the seaworthiness of foreign vessels which 
have entered their ports and, under some circumstances, to detain 
such vessels for violation of the conventions. The conventions do 
not impose a clear obligation on contracting States to admit vessels 
certificated by other contracting States; nor do they provide con-
tracting States with a clear right to exclude certificated vessels 
which they deem unsafe. The conventions require only that con-
tracting States treat vessels certificated by other contracting States 
on a par with their own ships.22 
Two important characteristics of this existing pattern for deal-
ing with vessel safety by international agreement need to be 
identified and related to the problems engendered by the nuclear 
propulsion of ships. 
First, assurance of ship safety has, in the past, been achieved 
through agreement on detailed design, construction, and operating 
standards and by the adoption of an approach to control over in-
dividual ships that is essentially unilateral in character. Precise 
criteria, however, are not yet possible for most elements of the 
safety of nuclear ships. During the present research and develop-
mental stage of reactor technology, the large reactors which are 
10 A brief but excellent history of the SOLAS Conferences is set forth in UNITED STATES 
COAST GUARD, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CONFERENCES ON MARINE SAFETY, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, CG 242 at 9-11 (1951). A conference to establish uniform principles 
and rules with regard to the limits to which ships on international voyages may be loaded 
was held in London in 1930. 
20 International Load Linc Convention, July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228, T .S. No. 858, 135 
L.N.T .S. 301. 
21 Note 18 supra. The convention entered into force on November 19, 1952. 
22 SOLAS Convention, supra note 18, Ch. I, General Provisions, Regulation 16; Load 
Line Convention, supra note 20, Art. 15. 
238 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
necessary for ship propulsion are not standardized. Even with 
respect to existing reactor types, only limited operating experience 
is available and many design changes for each new model can be 
expected. Reasonable assurance of the safety of a nuclear power 
plant, therefore, can be achieved only by means of a detailed 
hazards analysis of each reactor system. Such an evaluation must 
be made in light of all of the safety features designed into the 
reactor system, and must include consideration of the type of ship 
involved as well as the operating plans proposed for the vessel. 
Because of the many variables and their complete interrelationship 
in achieving the goal of reactor safety, about all that can be done 
by way of establishing an international reactor code is to set forth 
a general safety criterion, such as requiring "reasonable assurance 
that the health and safety of the public will be protected," and to 
specify the nature of the hazard evaluation which should be under-
taken. Although somewhat more detailed standards may be 
possible with respect to the construction of the hulls of nuclear 
ships and ·with respect to navigational requirements, hull construc-
tion standards undoubtedly will have to vary considerably with the 
size, type and function of particular vessels, and operating criteria, 
by and large, will be meaningful only if developed in detail in a 
context of the navigational hazards of a specific port or coastal 
area. In general, then, nuclear ship construction and operation 
is not amenable to the detailed standards that have been incor-
porated in existing conventions which deal with the safety of 
ships.23 
The second noteworthy characteristic of the existing pattern of 
international agreement on the safety of ships stems from the fact 
that the relatively standardized technology of conventional ships, 
and the hazards incident to their operation, have not required 
nations to consider an extensive revision of customary rules of in-
ternational law pertaining to the relative rights and obligations of 
vessels and coastal States in the various regimes of the sea. As a 
result, ship safety conventions have merely specified the right of 
coastal States to inspect foreign vessels about to enter their ports 
and have required that such States treat vessels certificated by other 
contracting States on a par with their own ships. There are, how-
ever, areas of uncertainty in international law regarding the rights 
of vessels and coastal States, particularly ·with respect to passage 
23 For a discussion of the problems of establishing detailed safety standards for the 
construction and operation of nuclear ships, see HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 
2, at 87-103. 
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through territorial waters and through areas of the high seas con-
tiguous to those waters,24 which are likely to assume greater signifi-
cance in a context of potential nuclear hazards. Under existing 
rules of international law, the distance beyond territorial waters 
at which health and safety controls can be imposed is uncertain; the 
right of a State to require the submission of information relating to 
safety as a condition of passage through its territorial sea is open to 
question; and the right of a coastal State to exclude foreign vessels 
in distress for reasons of safety is equivocal. 
Thus, in undertaking to deal with nuclear ships, the 1960 
Safety of Life at Sea Conference was confronted with novel prob-
lems which required at least some consideration of a departure from 
the traditional pattern of controlling ship safety. 
II. AN APPROACH TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONTROL OF 
NUCLEAR SHIPS 
A. The 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Conference Proposals 
The proposals adopted by the 1960 SOLAS Conference with 
respect to nuclear ships25 would incorporate in the 1948 Conven-
tion only a few, new, formalized regulations. These are limited 
to statements of general principles and procedures.26 In addition, 
the Conference adopted a number of recommendations to provide 
guidance for governments in the application of those principles 
and procedures.27 The proposed regulations provide that nuclear 
ships are subject to all other rules of the Convention.28 In broad 
outline, the regulations require approval by each flag State of the 
design, construction, and standards of inspection of the reactor 
installation,20 prescribe the development of a fully detailed operat-
ing manual,30 and call for the conduct of periodic surveys by the 
flag State.31 The test of radiation safety is " ... that there are no 
unreasonable radiation or other nuclear hazards, at sea or in port, 
to the crew, passengers, or public, or to the watenvays or food or 
water resources. "32 
24 For a detailed discussion of present legal rights and obligations of vessels and coastal 
States, id. at 123-295. 
25 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SAFEIT OF LIFE AT SEA, IMCO Doc. No. IMCO/ 
SAFCON/25/Rev. 1 (1960). 
20 Id., Annex B (Revised), Ch. VIII, Nuclear Ships. 
27 Id., Annex C (Revised), Recommendations Applicable to Nuclear Ships. 
28 Note 26 supra, Regulations 2 &: 3. 
20 Id., Regulations 4 &: 5. 
30 Id., Regulation 8. 
81 Id., Regulation 9. 
82 Id., Regulation 6. 
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Administratively, the proposed regulations incorporate a new 
control device. A flag State is required to prepare a "Safety As-
sessment" consonant with the prescribed test of safety,33 and to 
make the safety assessment " ... available sufficiently in advance to 
the Contracting Governments of the countries which a nuclear 
ship intends to visit so that they may evaluate the safety of the 
ship."34 The flag State may issue Nuclear Ship Safety Certifi-
cates.35 Presumably, consistent with the SOLAS requirements 
pertaining to conventional ships, such certificates would entitle a 
nuclear ship to be treated by foreign States on a par with nuclear 
vessels to which such States have issued their own certificates. 
Coastal States are authorized to inspect a vessel prior to its entry 
into ports36 for purposes of verifying the validity of the certificate 
and of determining whether operation is being conducted in con-
formance with the prescribed test of nuclear safety. 
These proposals for the control of nuclear ships follow closely 
the pattern of existing conventions on ship safety and incorporate 
only such departures from the traditional approach as are clearly 
necessitated by the present state of nuclear technology or by the 
demands which the Conference anticipated that coastal States 
would make. The areas of departure from tradition are these. 
First, the proposals do not incorporate detailed safety standards; 
rather, in recognition of the unstandardized state of the reactor 
art and the complex task of assuring reactor safety, a broad safety 
criterion is adopted and an evaluation of each nuclear ship by the 
flag State is required. Second, the proposals contemplate the 
advance transmittal of an evaluation report from the flag State to 
other States to permit an appraisal of the safety of the vessel prior 
to the time it seeks entry into the ports of those States. 
33 Id., Regulation 7 (a). 
34 Id., Regulation 7 (b). The description in the Recommendations of the appropriate 
contents of the Safety Assessment is in very general terms. Note 27 supra, Recommendation 
9. For example, the flag State is enjoined to make" •.• an evaluation of credible accidents 
which indicates that the hazards are minimized." Experience in the United States with 
reactor evaluations would indicate that this language could mean all things to all men. 
Consequently, precisely what constitutes an appropriate "evaluation of credible reactor 
accidents" may be a significant stumbling-block in achieving mutually acceptable arrange-
ments between flag and coastal States. 
35 Note 26 supra, Regulation 10. 
86 Id., Regulation 11. The Regulation does not specify at what distance the coastal 
State may assert this inspection right. Thus, it would seem that whatever exclusion rights 
are implicit in the provision for advance inspection, they may not include the right of the 
coastal State to exclude a vessel from territorial waters. 
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B. Goals of International Accord on the Safety of Nuclear Ships 
Before turning to an assessment of the adequacy of the 1960 
SOLAS Conference proposals, it is important to identify the goals 
of international agreement on the health and safety control of nu-
clear-powered ships. First and foremost, of course, is the necessity 
of assuring that nuclear vessels are safe. The use of atomic energy 
for the propulsion of vessels adds new scope to the problem of 
ship safety. Risk no longer will be confined to persons or property 
on board vessels or in the immediate harbor areas of ports. A 
major release of fission products from a ship's power plant could 
cause almost immediate and widespread damage on shore areas 
more than fifty miles away.37 In addition, such an incident could 
endanger other vessels within a considerable area, could contami-
nate the resources of the sea within an even greater radius, and 
could result in increased radiation levels in any region toward 
which there is a current or wind drift from the site of the release. 
Thus, not only do nuclear ships constitute an increased risk for in-
dividual coastal States, but they also present a significant hazard 
to the general interests of the community of nations in the re-
sources and use of the high seas. 
A second goal of international accord is the achievement of a 
climate that will encourage the development and use of nuclear 
propulsion for ships. The capital investment required for such 
ships is very substantial. Absent a proper developmental climate, 
which presupposes a significant degree of advance assurance that 
nuclear vessels will be comparatively free to pursue normal com-
mercial trade routes, even governments may not undertake the 
necessa,ry investments. Customary international law and existing 
bilateral and multilateral treaties provide coastal States with con-
siderable latitude to regulate and even prevent foreign vessels from 
traversing territorial waters for the purpose of entering ports, and 
may provide a basis for control well beyond territorial limits.38 
This means that unless nations agree upon the nature and limits of 
controls that can be exercised by coastal States, and devise a system 
which assures that nuclear vessels can enter most ports under some 
37 E.g., see UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, BROOKHAVEN REPORT, THEO-
RETICAL POSSIBJI.ITIES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WASH-740 
(1957). 
38 HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-40. 
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reasonable conditions, incentive for the construction of nuclear 
ships may be lacking. 
A third goal of international agreement on nuclear ships is the 
avoidance of disputes between nations. As we have seen, at the 
present time a criterion of nuclear safety can be only very general 
and therefore imprecise. We also have identified some of the 
numerous circumstances under which international law is equi-
vocal with respect to the unilateral acts a coastal State is entitled 
to take in order to protect itself from a significant risk of injury to 
its interests. When these facts are taken in conjunction with the 
prevailing widespread fear over radiation hazards, the operation 
of nuclear-powered ships is clearly an area of atomic energy activity 
ripe for international controversy. 
A fourth goal of international agreement is the establishment 
of a health and safety control system which will provide a realistic 
framework for achieving a solution to the problem of liability for 
injury and damage due to nuclear ship accidents. 
C. An Evaluation of the SOLAS Proposals 
In light of these goals, it is possible to identify a number of 
deficiencies that are inherent in the approach to the control of 
nuclear ships taken by the 1960 SOLAS Conference. 
I. Assuring Health and Safety. From the standpoint of as-
suring coastal States that their citizens and territories will be ade-
quately protected from nuclear hazards, the SOLAS proposals 
leave a good deal to be desired. The great majority of coastal 
States do not yet have the skills or experience to undertake mean-
ingful reactor evaluations, or even to assess evaluation reports 
transmitted to them by flag States. Even those few States which 
have achieved a considerable degree of sophistication in reactor 
technology may be somewhat less than fully reassured by the 
right to analyze an evaluation report made by a foreign State. This 
is particularly true because a thorough evaluation necessitates not 
only a review of final plans and operating procedures, but a detailed 
examination of components as they are fabricated or embodied in 
a reactor system. Thus, as a practical matter, the great majority of 
coastal States, and to a lesser degree all of them, will be placing 
primary reliance on the good faith and ability of the flag State. 
The significance of this weakness in the 1960 SOLAS pro-
posals may be magnified by the prevalence of a practice of register-
ing privately-owned vessels with States which impose the lowest 
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registration charges, minimal labor standards, and the least costly 
safety requirements. The possible future use of flags of con-
venience for nuclear ships is particularly troublesome because the 
States most commonly used in this respect are frequently those 
with relatively undeveloped degrees of technological competence. 
Admittedly, only nations of considerable technological sophistica-
tion are likely to have the facilities for constructing nuclear ships. 
However, even assuming a properly built vessel, assurance of safety 
will depend very much upon continuing surveillance by individ-
uals who have had a great deal of training and experience in reactor 
technology. It is doubtful that nations which hold themselves out 
as flags of convenience could, or by inclination would, obtain the 
services of foreign experts to undertake the task of continuing to 
review the safety of nuclear vessels which they register. To date, 
efforts to restrict the use of flags of convenience have not been 
particularly successful.39 Nor was there any meaningful effort to 
deal with this problem, either directly or indirectly,40 in the recent 
SOLAS Conference. 
The right of a coastal State to exclude nuclear vessels from its 
ports does not rectify these deficiencies in the SOLAS proposals. 
Because of the distance at which a fission product release can cause 
injury or damage, mere exclusion from territorial seas, or even 
from reasonably extended contiguous areas of the high seas, will 
not necessarily provide coastal States with a guarantee of the protec-
tion of their interests. In addition, a coastal State's use of the right 
to exclude vessels as a general method of protecting itself would 
have an obvious adverse impact on its economic and diplomatic 
relationships. 
From the standpoint of protecting the interests of the whole 
community of nations, the 1960 SOLAS proposals are even less 
effective and for substantially identical reasons. The safety of 
so The recent efforts of the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea to require a closer 
connection between a vessel and a State in order to justify registry with that State were far 
from adequate. The Convention on the High Seas, which was developed by the Confer-
ence, provides only that "There must be a genuine link between the State and the 
ship •..• " U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958), Art. 5. For a discussion of the inade-
quacy of this provision, see McDougal, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the 
Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25, 28-30 (1960). 
40 The Conference proposals merely require that the flag State keep its safety assess-
ment of the vessel up-to-date and specify that that State "assumes full responsibility for 
the certificate" of safety which it issues. Note 26 supra, Regulations 7 (a) and 10 (f). Even 
had the Conference not deemed it propitious to deal more comprehensively with the ques-
tion directly, it could have adopted some method of imposing sanctions on flag States that 
do not live up to their international obligation to assure the safety of nuclear vessels under 
their jurisdiction. Sec discussion infra, p. 254. 
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other vessels on the high seas, and the protection of the resources 
of the high seas from the risks engendered by any particular nu-
clear ship, will depend entirely on the degree to which a flag State 
voluntarily complies with its international obligations. While 
coastal States can take some steps under international law to protect 
persons or property within territorial limits, no compulsory legal 
forum exists for enforcing the rights of nations to navigate and 
use the resources of the high seas. 
In final analysis, then, the SOLAS proposals incorporate no ef-
fective means for an independent check on whether a flag State is 
meeting its international obligations, a question that cannot be 
resolved very satisfactorily by the cursory and varied inspections 
which will take place when a vessel is waiting to enter ports. In 
addition, the proposals fail to embody general sanctions designed 
to stimulate flag State compliance with those obligations. 
2. Encouraging Use and Development. A second limitation 
inherent in the 1960 SOLAS Conference approach is the likelihood 
that it will not create a developmental climate that will encourage 
investment in the application of nuclear propulsion to ships. In 
the first place, the procedures prescribed for obtaining permission 
to enter foreign ports may well prove economically onerous. The 
probability that ship operators will be required to obtain advance 
approval from a considerable number of coastal States, each ap-
proval being based on a detailed review of the initial safety assess-
ment made by the flag State, is likely to constitute a significant 
burden. In addition, different national interpretations of a general 
criterion of nuclear safety may result in inconsistent or even in-
compatible requirements, thus adding to the burden. Moreover, 
since it would be impractical to have five or ten nations evaluating 
the safety of a nuclear propulsion plant concurrently with its de-
sign, construction, and evaluation by the flag State, the assessment 
of the safety of a vessel by other States probably will take place only 
after construction is completed. At that time, changes or altera-
tions which those States may require are likely to be extremely 
expensive if they are possible at all. None of these circumstances 
is conducive to investment in a technology that is economically 
marginal. 
Second, the SOLAS proposals will not provide the prospective 
builder of a nuclear vessel with much assurance that his ship, even 
if certificated by the flag State, will be able to operate freely in in-
ternational commerce. As we have seen, the 1948 SOLAS Con-
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vention does not impose an affirmative obligation on coastal States 
to admit foreign vessels; it merely requires them to treat such 
vessels on a par with their flag ships. Until most coastal States 
have nuclear vessels flying their flags, the concept of equal treat-
ment will not be very meaningful. And, even when most coastal 
States have registered nuclear vessels, a requirement of "equal 
treatment" will not prove very reassuring to an operator until we 
are able to develop detailed safety standards or other means of as-
suring reasonably uniform interpretations of a general criterion of 
reactor safety.41 
The failure of the SOLAS proposals to provide nuclear ship 
operators with a reasonable degree of advance assurance that their 
vessels will have access to foreign ports could, of course, be allevi-
ated by the negotiation of formal bilateral agreements between a 
flag State and all coastal States which each nuclear vessel is likely to 
visit. This remedy, however, ultimately may prove to be more 
harmful than the ill. Assuming that a considerable number of 
nuclear merchant vessels are in eventual prospect, the solution pre-
supposes a world-wide complex of bilateral agreements that will be 
confusing and perhaps impossible to administer effectively. More-
over, even if we suppose conservatively only one hundred nuclear 
vessels,42 the mere negotiation of bilateral agreements can be ex-
pected to tax severely governmental and industrial resources of 
technically qualified personnel. 
3. Avoiding International Controversy. A third deficiency 
inherent in the 1960 SOLAS proposals is the absence of effective 
means for preventing international disputes. Without a yardstick 
to assure reasonably uniform interpretations of a broad safety 
criterion, it is inevitable that different nations, and even different 
41 When most coastal States have vessels flying their flags and there has been interna-
tional agreement on detailed ship safety standards, as is the situation for conventional 
vessels under the SOLAS and Load Line conventions, the concept of equal treatment affords 
a meaningful degree of assurance to ship operators. Absent either factor, the concept of 
equal treatment will mean very little. If a State has no comparable vessel of its own, it 
will remain entirely free to treat foreign vessels arbitrarily. If a State does have comparable 
vessels flying its flag but detailed ship safety standards are lacking, the leeway of interpre-
tation afforded by a very general criterion of safety will leave it relatively free to act arbi-
trarily with respect to foreign vessels. See HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 
366, and discussion infra, pp. 249-50. 
42 A recent study by a working group of the United States National Academy of Sci-
ences, for example, adopted a premise of 300 nuclear-powered vessels by about 1970. 
PRITCHARD, and others, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM 
NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS INTO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES -
NATIONAL R.EsEARCH COUNCIL REPORT at 7 (Pub. No. 658, 1959). 
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authorities within a nation, will disagree as to what constitutes an 
"unreasonable radiation or other nuclear hazard."43 And, even 
assuming that a flag State and a coastal State come to agreement on 
the adequacy of a safety assessment and the general reliability of a 
particular vessel, the possibilities for controversy over safety still 
are considerable, particularly in the absence of any clarification 
of the unilateral acts which a coastal State is permitted to take to 
protect itself. For example, a coastal State may find that a nuclear 
vessel has not been operated strictly in accordance with the con-
ditions of its safety assessment, but not in a manner that could 
create a serious risk of a nuclear accident. To what extent would 
the coastal State be justified in excluding the vessel from territorial 
waters, or, more troublesome, from contiguous areas of the high 
seas beyond territorial waters? Not only do the SOLAS proposals 
fail to incorporate guides which might avoid controversy over such 
questions, but the proposals, and indeed the 1948 SOLAS Con-
vention itself,44 fail to provide or suggest means for resolving such 
disputes. 
4. Solving the Liability Problem. Finally, the approach of 
the recently proposed amendments to the 1948 SOLAS Conven-
tion clearly is not conducive to a realistic resolution of the problem 
of legal liability for radiation damage resulting from nuclear ship 
accidents. As already noted,45 there was recognition at the Rijeka 
Conference that governmental indemnities probably would be 
necessary to supplement the private insurance coverage available. 
However, it is distinctly possible that a number of small but active 
maritime nations may be unable to make firm commitments to 
assume :financial responsibility for damages from a nuclear accident 
in amounts which States are likely to demand as a condition of 
permitting foreign nuclear ships to enter their ports. This pos-
sibility suggests the need for a multi-national indemnification pool 
and highlights the interrelationship between health and safety con-
trols and a satisfactory resolution of the liability problem. If a 
pooling of national indemnification commitments is necessary, the 
acceptability of such an arrangement probably would depend on 
the existence of means for all of the pooling nations to have at 
least a sense of participation in approving the design and operating 
ts Note 32 supra. 
44 HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 345. 
45 Note 14 supra. 
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plans for all vessels covered by the pool.46 The essentially uni-
lateral approach to the health and safety control of individual nu-
clear ships adopted in the SOLAS proposals does not provide a 
framework of control through which nations can acquire this 
sense of participation in assuring the safety of foreign nuclear 
vessels. 
5. Conclusion. It seems clear from the foregoing analysis 
that the 1960 SOLAS Conference proposals on nuclear ships, and 
indeed the basic approach which underlies those proposals, are 
conceptually inadequate for the time when a relatively large num-
ber of nuclear ships will be operating.47 Moreover, the proposals 
will not create a climate that is likely to encourage the develop-
ment and construction of nuclear ships. The best that can be said 
of the SOLAS proposals is that they may not prove to be an im-
mediate impediment during the period when governments are 
willing to commit funds for the construction of experimental 
vessels. In addition, of course, by recognizing the need for evaluat-
ing the hazards of each ship, as well as the importance of detailed 
operating manuals and periodic surveys, the proposals do provide 
a sound technological base for international agreement on a system 
of control that could prove conceptually adequate. 
Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to achieve the objectives already described, and at the 
same time to provide a control system that should prove acceptable 
to the great majority of nations, we would offer the following out-
line of a convention on nuclear ship safety. 
46 It is not at all clear that the Rijeka Conference recognized this need. Recommenda-
tion II of the Conference states: "In view of the international obligations which it will 
obviously be necessary for the States to assume under treaty, the Conference also suggests 
that some form of international machinery should be agreed upon to facilitate and ensure 
the carrying out of these obligations." Note 8 supra. Although this language could be 
construed to suggest some type of international health and safety control machinery that 
would facilitate indemnity pooling arrangements, the inference is not easy to draw. 
41 Although no major power recommended a more radical approach to control, it is 
fairly clear that the Conference went about as far as it could in proposing departures from 
the strictly traditional approach to ship safety. The Soviet delegate to the Conference, 
along with others, strenuously objected even to the provision for the exchange of safety 
assessments that was ultimately adopted. The objection was grounded on the conclusion 
that requiring such an exchange would seriously hinder the development of nuclear pro-
pulsion. The Soviets apparently felt that no e.xchange of hazards information was necessary. 
New York Times, June 14, 1960, p. 62, col. 7. 
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A. International Evaluation of Nuclear Ships 
Because detailed and precise reactor safety criteria are not now 
possible, the key element of a reactor control system is the evalua-
tion of the plant against a general criterion of safety. If such a 
system is to be effective, however, means must be devised which 
will assure that evaluations are adequate from the standpoint of 
safety and that they result in a reasonably uniform application and 
interpretation of the safety criterion. The most effective method 
of accomplishing these objectives would be to have a convention 
adopt a safety criterion and require that each commercial, or 
nonmilitary, nuclear-powered vessel to be registered by a contract-
ing State be evaluated by a permanent international organization 
designated to undertake that function. The flag State would be free, 
and perhaps should even be required, to conduct its own concur-
rent evaluation. In practical effect, the two evaluations could 
complement and serve as reciprocal checks. Although somewhat 
unique in concept, this international evaluation mechanism ap-
pears to be the only practicable answer to the limitations inherent 
in a unilateral approach to the problem. 
The international evaluation body would be performing a 
vital service for States that have not developed the skills essential 
to the evaluation of reactor hazards. It also would provide those 
States with an independent assessment of the hazards of each nu-
clear ship. In addition, since such a body is likely to be quite ob-
jective about particular nuclear vessels, its determinations should 
provide all nations with considerable assurance of the safety of 
other vessels and of the protection of the resources of the marine 
environment. 
Further, evaluation by an international body ought to minimize 
the potential financial and administrative burdens on those op-
erating nuclear ships. In this context, international evaluation 
should result in the application of reasonably consistent safety re-
quirements and in limiting to two the number of detailed evalua-
tions likely to be required. Also, since the international body 
could, and presumably would, conduct its evaluation concurrently 
with design and construction of a vessel, any necessary changes in 
the reactor system or hull could be made at a time when modifica-
tions remained feasible and least costly. Finally, because of the 
breadth of experience it would acquire, the evaluation body rapid-
ly should become the repository of a vast amount of information 
on various techniques of reactor design and fabrication. This con-
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centration of knowledge could prove to be a convenient and 
valuable source of technical assistance to nations interested in the 
manufacture or purchase of reactors. 
Admittedly, evaluation by an international body will involve 
some risk that particular determinations may, through the in-
dividuals who serve on the body, reflect national political consid-
erations. However, such a risk could be minimized if the interna-
tional body were to employ a full-time staff to evaluate reactors 
instead of following a regular practice of using consultants who 
may have less insulation from their respective governments. In 
any event, since a group judgment is involved, the impact of the 
views of one or two members acting occasionally on the basis of na-
tional political motivations should not be too great. 
B. International Certification of Nuclear Ships 
In addition to evaluating nuclear ships, the international or-
ganization should be authorized to issue a safety certificate to a 
vessel which it has determined complies with the safety criterion 
and other requirements of the convention. To alleviate the dis-
advantages which stem from the right of States to exclude vessels 
arbitrarily from their ports, certification by the international body 
should create an affirmative obligation on the part of coastal States 
to permit a vessel to enter. Obviously, a convention provision 
that certification by the organization would bind contracting States 
to admit nuclear vessels to ports would afford ship operators the 
greatest measure of advance assurance. It is doubtful, however, 
that such a provision would be acceptable to many States. On the 
other hand, if an international certificate were given prima facie 
force and effect, the operator would be afforded a reasonable degree 
of assurance without precluding coastal States from exercising in-
dependent judgments. This result could be achieved by imposing 
an obligation on contracting States not to exclude a certificated 
vessel from ports or territorial seas without first making an affirma-
tive determination that the construction or operation of the vessel 
failed to conform to the general criterion of safety adopted by the 
convention. In effect, member States would be agreeing to use 
the evaluation report prepared by the international body as a 
yardstick for their own determinations. Thus, while coastal 
States would not be bound to admit vessels approved by the inter-
national body, a determination by a State that a particular vessel 
did not conform to the safety criterion would, as a practical matter, 
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have to refute the technical validity of the evaluations made by 
the international body and the flag State. 
The advantage of this approach is that it imposes a heavy moral 
burden on coastal States to accept ships which have been certificated 
by the international body without imposing a legal obligation 
which would render the convention politically unacceptable. It 
is worth noting also that this approach is more analogous, in effect 
at least, to the control of conventional vessels under the Load Line 
and Safety of Life at Sea conventions than is the approach to the 
control of nuclear ships taken by the 1960 SOLAS Conference. An 
international evaluation report would provide States with the kind 
of objective, detailed specifications for assessing the safety of a 
nuclear vessel that the Load Line and Safety of Life at Sea con-
ventions provide through precise safety standards. 
C. Agreement on Rights and Obligations 
Certainly if a convention is to adopt this positive approach of 
imposing a prima facie obligation on coastal States to admit nu-
clear vessels holding an international certificate, it should clarify, 
and in some respects expand, the rights of those States to take acts 
necessary to protect their interests. 
Requiring a coastal State to make an affirmative determination 
before excluding a nuclear vessel presupposes that State's right to 
inspect the vessel at some time prior to a proposed entry. The 
potential magnitude of impact of a major nuclear accident sug-
gests the necessity of authorizing coastal States to conduct their 
inspections at some point more distant than just outside ports, as 
well as the desirability of specifying the right of coastal States to 
inspect nuclear vessels traversing territorial seas without the in-
tention of entering adjacent ports. Consequently, a convention 
should give contracting States a right to require prior notice from 
nuclear vessels intending to enter territorial waters and should 
authorize such States to inspect at the time the vessel enters the 
territorial sea. While providing for inspection at greater distances 
from shore would afford coastal States even more assurance of safety, 
the inconvenience probably is not warranted in the case of vessels 
that have been certificated by an international evaluation body. 
In addition to desiring to inspect nuclear ships at a considerable 
distance from their shores, it is quite conceivable that contracting 
States may not want to open all of their ports to foreign nuclear 
vessels until more operating experience has been acquired. In 
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recogmt10n of this, the convention should permit contracting 
States to close some of their ports to all foreign nuclear ships. So 
long as the closed ports are specified at the time a State ratifies the 
convention, foreign nuclear ship operators could plan accordingly. 
However, if the over-all purpose and spirit of such a convention is 
to be achieved, this closure of individual ports to all foreign nu-
clear vessels would have to be consistent with a general obligation 
on each contracting State to open a reasonable number of its ports 
to certificated nuclear vessels. 
It also is possible that contracting States may need temporarily 
to close ports or territorial seas to all nuclear ships because of 
special hazardous circumstances. For example, the impending ar-
rival of a tidal wave would justify a coastal State in excluding all 
nuclear vessels from any ports likely to be affected. A convention 
would have to give contracting States a right to take reasonable 
acts of this nature under emergency circumstances. 
As we have seen, international law is not entirely clear with 
respect to the rights of vessels in distress when the condition of 
distress could constitute a risk to the safety of the coastal State. 
Generally, vessels in distress have a right of free access to the ports 
of foreign States. Although the humanitarian rationale for this 
rule would seem to afford equal justification for the exercise of 
reasonable control by a coastal State over a vessel in distress that 
seeks access to one of its ports, the kinds of control that a State can 
exercise under these circumstances are anything but well defined.48 
When viewed in a context of the potential hazards of nuclear ships, 
this lack of clarity suggests the desirability of a specific provision 
in the convention granting States the right to deny entry to nuclear 
vessels in distress upon an affirmative determination by the State 
that the risk to its interests would outweigh the risk to the vessel 
and the cargo and persons abroad. Of course, the State should have 
an obligation to take all reasonable steps to alleviate the adverse 
impact on any vessel so excluded. 
Finally, a convention might also clarify the rights of coastal 
States with respect to nuclear vessels that either have not been 
certificated by the international organization, or whose certificates 
have been suspended, revoked, or not renewed as required. Mani-
festly, such vessels deserve little consideration from the community 
of nations. Consequently, it would not be inappropriate, because 
~s See HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 153, and materials cited therein. 
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of the range at which reactor accidents can cause harmful effects, 
to give each State a right to exercise jurisdiction and control over, 
and to prohibit the operation of, any uncertificated vessel at as 
great a distance from its coast as the State deems necessary to protect 
persons and property within its territory. 
D. Agreement on the Mechanisms of Control 
I. Regulations. In addition to establishing a system of inter-
national evaluation and certification, and clarifying various rights 
and obligations of nuclear vessels and coastal States, a convention 
also should impose an affirmative obligation on flag States to main-
tain adequate controls over the nuclear vessels which they register. 
A general obligation of this nature should, of course, be reinforced 
by such detailed safety requirements as are possible with respect 
to the construction, operation, and navigation of nuclear ships. 
Although nuclear ship technology has not yet reached a stage at 
which the development of precise safety criteria is possible, greater 
standardization and more experience will facilitate the develop-
ment of increasingly detailed standards. As this occurs, it will 
become ever more important that there be a stimulus for national 
adoption of internationally prescribed regulations. And, if the 
regulations are to be maintained reasonably current, uniform, and 
of a calibre that will give the greatest possible protection to all 
nations, means also must be devised to facilitate their amendment 
and to assure the greatest possible degree of national conformity 
to such amendments. 
Experience has proved that these goals will not be achieved 
unless the parties to an international convention are required to 
take affirmative steps in order not to be bound by new or amended 
regulations. It is clear also that the needs of an era of rapid tech-
nological development cannot be met by convening diplomatic 
conferences at widely separated intervals of time in order to develop 
appropriate regulatory amendments. Thus, a convention on the 
safety of nuclear ships should authorize a permanent international 
organization to recommend safety regulations which would be bind-
ing on all contracting States that fail to take an affirmative excep-
tion within a specified period of time. In addition, because the 
hazards of nuclear-powered ships are considerable, regulations or 
amendments determined to be of particular significance from the 
standpoint of safety should be made binding on all contracting 
States once they become binding on a majority of those States. A 
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number of existing conventions incorporate these kinds of provi-
sions for encouraging the adoption and assuring the harmonization 
of national regulations that have international impact.49 
Of course, some regulatory aspects of nuclear ship control are, 
and will remain, inherently incapable of standardization. For 
example, variations in local traffic conditions and port character-
istics would make it unrealistic to attempt to prescribe uniform 
speed limits and docking or mooring requirements. Such matters 
must be left to local authorities. A convention, however, could 
minimize the burden of special requirements by specifically delim-
iting the matters which are within the discretion of local authorities 
and by requiring that local rules be made currently available to 
all contracting States. 
2. Inspection and Enforcement. Because the consequences of 
a serious reactor accident could be disastrous, a convention on 
nuclear ship safety should incorporate every practicable means for 
assuring that contracting States comply ·with their obligation to 
maintain continuing control over flag vessels. This suggests a need 
for a system of independent inspection of individual ships, as well 
as for penalties which can be imposed on States that have not ful-
filled their commitments. 
Under the foregoing recommendations, coastal States that are 
parties to the convention would have a right to inspect certificated 
nuclear vessels just prior to their entry into the State's territorial 
sea. This right of inspection might include monitoring radiation 
levels, physical inspection of the reactor plant, and examination 
of logs or other operating records. If coastal States are required to 
conduct inspections in accordance with an international inspection 
manual, and to report infractions of the convention's rules to an 
international body, there would be a frequent check, by inde-
pendent experts, on the safety of individual nuclear vessels. Add 
to this a requirement of a periodic survey of such vessels and their 
operating records by the international evaluation group, and ample 
means probably would exist for determining whether flag States 
and vessel operators are complying with their obligations under 
the convention. 
To the extent that noncompliance is disclosed, the interna-
tional body, as a minimum, should be authorized to suspend or 
revoke its safety certificates. In addition, sanctions should be avail-
40 Id. at 317-25. 
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able for imposition against a flag State, as contrasted with a vessel 
owner,50 if the investigation of an infraction discloses that the State 
itself has been delinquent in controlling a ship bearing its registry. 
Certainly a suspension of the right of a flag State to have any of its 
nuclear flag ships treated as being properly certificated would 
neither be unreasonable nor unprecedented.51 In addition, con-
sideration should be given to the advisability of more stringent 
sanctions such as imposing embargoes on atomic energy materials, 
technical information, and research assistance to defaulting States. 
Naturally, special procedures, such as a vote of two-thirds of the 
contracting States, would have to be devised for purposes of deter-
mining when to impose particular sanctions. 
Consideration might also be given to the need for the imposi-
tion of sanctions on noncontracting States whose flag vessels fail to 
meet international standards. The right to impose sanctions on 
noncontracting governments is warranted when failure to conform 
to international codes of conduct could jeopardize the interests of 
the whole community of nations. Such an extension of sanctions 
beyond contracting parties also is supported by precedent.52 
3. Resolution of Disputes. Finally, a convention should pro-
vide a mechanism for the resolution of disputes in the absence of 
agreement by the parties to an alternative means of settlement. 
Even if the recommended clarifications of rights and obligations 
are adopted, disputes probably will arise. For example, nations 
may disagree as to whether particular circumstances afforded ample 
justification for the temporary closure of a port to nuclear vessels, 
or whether the exclusion of a particular vessel in distress was rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Since such disputes are more 
likely to involve complex scientific and technical issues than strictly 
legal questions, it may be appropriate to consider the advisability 
of establishing a special panel of experts to render arbitration 
services.53 A permanent arbitration panel could be established by 
50 It would seem reasonably clear that, aside from the revocation or suspension of a 
ship's certificate, States would resist direct punitive action by an international organization 
against the operator of a vessel. 
51E.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Art. 88. 
52 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs (1931), July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301, Art. 14; 
International Opium Convention (1925), Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317, Art. 24; CHARTER OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS, Arts. 41-42. 
53 The other alternative would be to provide for the submission of disputes to the 
International Court of Justice. However, difficulties caused by existing reservations to the 
1960] SAFETY CONTROL OF NUCLEAR SHIPS 255 
the convention, or provision could be made whereby the executive 
body of an appropriate international organization could appoint 
expert panels to deal with particular disputes. 
E. Organizational Responsibility for Administering the Control 
System 
The designation of an international organization to administer 
the provisions of a convention on nuclear ships is another matter 
that must be settled. Controlling nuclear ships clearly is a problem 
which calls for global agreement. Regional organizations may have 
appropriate roles of a supplemental character, but effective control 
would seem to require that an international body of world scope 
assume primary responsibility. Two existing organizations of 
global scope encompass talents and experience particularly perti-
nent to the controls that are necessary. One is the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) which came 
into being in 195854 to take consultative and advisory cognizance 
over matters of maritime safety.65 The other is the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Statute of the IAEA author-
izes the Agency to adopt "standards of safety for protection of 
health and minimization of danger to life and property ... "56 in the 
field of atomic energy. The relationship agreement between the 
Agency and the United Nations recognizes the IAEA "as the agency 
. . . responsible for international activities concerned with the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy."67 Thus, the charters of both or-
ganizations provide some justification for each to claim primary 
responsibility for the control of nuclear ships. However, it is the 
radiation hazard that supplies the justification for the special con-
trols recommended, and the United Nations relationship agree-
ment with the IAEA does seems to recognize the Agency's primacy 
in matters of nuclear safety. 
In addition, there are several practical reasons for reposing 
primary responsibility in the IAEA. The most cogent of these 
jurisdiction of the Court, and the possibility of delays resulting from the Court's having 
to cope with complex technical matters, do not commend this choice. For a more detailed 
discussion of this alternative, see HYDE!llAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 340-41. 
54 Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March 
6, 1948, T.I.A.S. 4044. 
Gu Id., Art. I (a). 
tiO STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Art. III, para. A, 6. 
G7 U.N. Doc. No. A/3620, Art. I (I) (1957), adopted by the United Nations on Nov. 
14, 1957, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 12th Sess., Annexes, 2 (1957). 
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stems from the need for an international body to establish a full-
time staff to evaluate the safety of ship reactors. The IAEA has 
begun to gather a staff of experts in the field of reactor safety and 
already has developed some experience in evaluating land-based 
reactors. This same staff could, with a limited amount of assistance 
from individuals expert in general matters of ship safety, perform 
the identical function in connection with nuclear ships. The con-
verse, however, is not true; the ship safety experts of IMCO would 
need considerable assistance from a variety of nuclear experts in 
order to evaluate reactor hazards effectively. Because the number 
of individuals who are qualified and willing to undertake this task 
is small, any assignment of responsibility which would require the 
establishment of an additional reactor safety group at the inter-
national level should be avoided. 
The Agency's present activities in two other closely related 
areas also suggest the desirability of giving it primary responsibility 
for developing and administering a convention on the international 
control of nuclear ships. The international community already 
has assigned responsibility with respect to the sea disposal of radio-
active wastes to the IAEA.68 Since the disposal of atomic wastes 
from nuclear-powered ships is likely to constitute a significant 
segment of sea disposal activities, it will be desirable to harmonize 
the systems ultimately adopted for controlling nuclear vessels and 
the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea. The IAEA also has indi-
cated its intention to consider the problem of the liability of nu-
clear ship operators.69 As we have seen, a close correlation of solu-
tions to the liability and health and safety control problems may 
be essential.60 Obviously, the most effective coordination of these 
interrelated problems can be achieved if primary responsibility is 
vested in a single competent body. 
In final analysis, an effective system for controlling the hazards 
of nuclear ships will require the talents of both IMCO and the 
IAEA; therefore, no matter where primary responsibility 1s re-
posed, cooperation between the two will be essential. 
58 Resolution on Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials, U.N. Doc. No. 
A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958). 
59 Statement by the Director General of the IAEA at the opening of the Agency's third 
General Conference on Sept. 22, 1959, reported in Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic 
Industry Reporter, News and Analysis 5:319 (1959). 
60 See discussion supra, p. 246. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This outline of a convention for the multinational control of 
nuclear ships01 admittedly constitutes a significant departure from 
the traditional pattern of maritime safety conventions. However, 
precedents, or very close analogies, for most of the recommended 
elements of control can be found in existing multinational agree-
ments.02 Thus, the recommended approach is not so unique, at 
least in a general context of international accord, as it might at first 
appear. To the extent that such a control system does represent a 
departure from tradition in the field of maritime safety or in inter-
national law, it may be sufficient to observe that there is nothing 
traditional about the hazards of atomic energy and that problems 
of new magnitude frequently demand novel solutions. 
Just when such a convention on the safety of nuclear ships will 
become essential, rather than merely desirable, is not susceptible 
of precise delimitation. There are, however, factors which indicate 
the advisability of beginning to consider the long-range require-
ments promptly. First, although there exists at present a general 
atmosphere of pessimism about the early achievement of economi-
cally competitive nuclear ships, technological progress frequently 
exceeds expectations. Adequate health and safety controls should 
precede any significant growth in the number of nuclear ships. 
Second, achieving agreement between nations depends very con-
siderably on the ease with which national interests can be recon-
ciled. Efforts to achieve accord, therefore, should be made before 
national adherence to a unilateral concept of control becomes too 
fixed. Third, the process of achieving international accord, par-
ticularly when agreement involves a significant departure from 
tradition, may require a considerable period of time. Certainly 
a lapse of ten years for the development and ratification of a 
convention of the type necessary is not beyond the realm of possi-
bility.03 Finally, early agreement on the type of convention out-
61 A more detailed description of such a convention is set forth in HYDEMAN & BERMAN, 
op. cit. supra note 2, at 363-73 • 
62 Id. at 316-45. Although the concept of evaluation by an international body is the 
element of control which finds the least support in precedent, even that is merely another 
means, necessitated by the present state and complexity of reactor technology, for achieving 
the well-accepted goal of protecting public health through international agreement on 
standards of safety. See discussion supra, pp. 249-50. 
63 It is interesting to note that the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, supra note 54, was signed in March 1948 and did not enter into 
force until March 1958. For a description of the halting steps toward ratification, see 
REIFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA 220-22 (1959). 
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lined may be a prerequisite to any substantial development of com-
mercial nuclear ships. Therefore, to encourage the development 
and use of nuclear-powered vessels for peaceful purposes, we should 
begin promptly to plan more adequately for the future. 
